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The Resource Exploitation Model
Throughout most of history, expansion of the area cultivated or grazed has represented the dominant source of increase in agricultural produc tion. The most dramatic example in western history was the opening up of the new continents North and South America and Australia to European settlement during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the advent of cheap transport during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the countries of the new continents became increasingly im portant sources of food and agricultural raw materials for the metropolitan countries of Western Europe.
Similar processes had occurred earlier, though at a less dramatic pace, in the peasant and village economies of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The agrarian colonization of the Indus and Ganges river valleys occurred in the third millennium B.C. The first millennium A.D. saw the agricultural colonization of Europe north of the Alps, the Chinese set tlement of the lands south of the Yangtze, and the Bantu occupation of Africa south of the tropical forest belts. Intensification of land use in existing villages was followed by pioneer settlement, the establish ment of new villages, and the opening up of forest or jungle land to cultivation. In Western Europe there was a series of successive changes from neolithic forest fallow to systems of shifting cultivation of bush and grassland followed first by short fallow systems, and later by an nual cropping.
Where soil conditions were favorable, as in the great river basins and plains, the new villages gradually intensified their system of cultiva tion. Where soil resources were poor, as in many of the hill and upland regions, new areas were opened up to shifting cultivation or nomadic grazing. Under conditions of rapid population growth, the limits to the resource exploitation model were often quickly realized. Crop yields were typically low measured in terms of output per unit of seed rather than per unit of crop area. Output per hectare and per man-hour tended to decline except in the delta areas of Egypt and South Asia and in the wet rice areas of East Asia. In many areas the result was increasing burden on the peasantry.
Agriculture carried on within the framework of the resource exploita tion model was, in most parts of the world, capable of supporting only very limited urban concentrations trading centers and seats of govern ment. Most food was consumed in the village in which it was produc ed. Much of the surplus that did become available was extracted from the village by the landlords in the form of rents, and by the church in the form of tithes. The limited surplus that could be accumulated ex erted a decisive impact on political organizations. Charlemagne's cam paigns against the Germans to extend his Prankish kingdom could not be waged until early summer. The great heavy horses that carried his armed knights had to be out on grass, after a winter on poor feed, long enough to get in condition.
There are relatively few remaining areas of the world where develop ment along the lines of the resource exploitation model will represent an efficient source of growth during the last two decades of the twen tieth century. The 1960s saw the "closing of the frontier" in most areas of Southeast Asia. In Latin American and Africa, the opening up of new lands awaits development of technologies for the control of pests and diseases (such as the tsetse fly in Africa) or for the release and maintenance of productivity of problem soils. The decline in food pro duction that has been experienced in many African countries over the last several decades is an insistent reminder that agricultural growth along the lines described by the resource exploitation model is no longer a reliable source of growth in food production.
The Conservation Model
The conservation model of agricultural development evolved from the advances in crop and livestock husbandry associated with the English agricultural revolution and the notions of soil exhaustion suggested by the early German chemists and soil scientists. It was reinforced by the application to land of the concept, developed in the English classical school of economics, of diminishing returns to labor and capital.
Until well into the twentieth century, the conservation model of agricultural development was the only approach to intensification of 12 Ruttan agricultural production available to most of the world's farmers. Its ap plication is effectively illustrated by the development of the wet rice culture systems that emerged in East and Southeast Asia and by the laborand land-intensive systems of integrated crop-livestock husbandry which increasingly characterized European agriculture during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
During the English agricultural revolution, more intensive crop rota tion systems replaced the open-three-field system in which arable land was allocated between permanent cropland and permanent pasture. This involved the introduction and more intensive use of new forage and green manure crops and an increase in the availability and use of animal manures. This "new husbandry" permitted the intensification of croplivestock production through the recycling of plant nutrients, in the form of animal manures, to maintain soil fertility. The inputs used in this conservation system of farming the plant nutrients, animal power, land improvements, physical capital, and agricultural labor force were large ly produced or supplied by the agricultural sector itself.
Agricultural development, within the framework of the conservation model, clearly was capable in many parts of the world of sustaining rates of growth in agricultural production in the range of 1.0 percent per year over relatively long periods of time. The most serious recent effort to develop agriculture within this framework was made by the People's Republic of China in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It became readily apparent, however, that the feasible growth rates, even with a rigorous recycling effort, were not compatible with modern rates of growth in the demand for agricultural output which typically fall inthe 3-5 percent range in the less developed countries (LDCs). The con servation model remains an important source of productivity growth in most poor countries and an inspiration to agrarian fundamentalists and the organic farming movement in the developed countries.
The Location Model
Initially, the location model was formulated in Germany by J.H. von Thiinen to explain geographic variations in the intensity of farming systems and the productivity of labor in an industralizing society. In the United States, it was extended to explain the more effective perfor mance of the input and product markets in regions of rapid urbanindustrial development than in regions of slower urban-industrial development. In the 1950s, interest in the location model reflected con cern with the failure of agricultural resource development and price policies, adopted in the 1930s, to remove the persistent regional disparities in agricultural productivity and rural incomes in the United States.
The rationale for this model was developed in terms of more effec tive input and product markets in areas of rapid urban-industrial develop ment. Industrial development stimulated agricultural development by expanding the demand for farm products, supplying the industrial in puts needed to improve agricultural productivity, and drawing away surplus labor from agriculture. The empirical tests of the location model have confirmed repeatedly that a strong nonfarm labor market is a prere quisite for labor productivity in agriculture and improved incomes for rural people.
The policy implications of the location model appear to be most rele vant for less developed regions of highly industrialized countries or lag ging regions of the more rapidly growing LDCs. Agricultural develop ment policies based on this model appear to be particularly inappropriate in those countries where the "pathological" growth of urban centers is a result of population pressures in rural areas running ahead of employ ment growth in urban areas.
The Diffusion Model
The diffusion of better husbandry practices was a major source of productivity growth even in premodem societies. The diffusion of crops and animals from the new world to the old potatoes, maize, cassava, rubber and from the old world to the new sugar, wheat, and domestic livestock was an important by-product of the voyages of discovery and trade from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.
Diffusion of crops and animals had historically proceeded as a by product of trade, discovery and migration. The diffusion of maize to the Old World is an example. Within a decade after Columbus had first 14 Ruttan displayed Indian Cora (maize) at the Spanish court, it was being grown in the Po Valley in Northern Italy. In that relatively short time it had diffused from Spain and across North Africa to Turkey and was brought to the Po Valley by Venetian traders.
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, all major agricultural na tions were actively engaged in organized crop exploration and introduc tion. The famous trip of Captain Bligh to the South Pacific, described in the book and the film, Mutiny on the Bounty, was undertaken as a crop exploration mission. His assignment was to bring back breadfruit seedlings and wild sugarcane cultivars.
Botanical gardens were established by the great colonial powers primarily to serve as crop introduction stations. The diffusion of rub ber from Brazil to Southeast Asia illustrates their role. When the pro cess of vulcanization was invented making it possible to produce such desirable products as rubber boots, raincoats and tyres the price of natural rubber, produced from wild trees in the Amazon basin of Brazil, skyrocketed. Brazil made it illegal to export either rubber seeds or rubber plants. The British sent a botanical expedition to Brazil with the osten sible purpose of collecting plants that had medicinal value, but they also brought back rubber seeds. The seeds were first sprouted at the Royal Botanical Garden at Kew. The seedlings were then transferred to the botanical gardens at Kandy (Ceylon) and in Singapore. The Kandy seed lings died but the Singapore seedlings lived and became the foundation stock of the rubber industry in Southeast Asia.
In the early post-World War n period, the diffusion model provided the intellectual foundation for technical assistance to developing coun tries. President Truman talked about American "know-how showhow." The naive diffusion approach drew on the empirical observa tion of substantial differences in land and labor productivity among farmers and regions. The route to agricultural development in this view was through more effective dissemination of technical knowledge and the narrowing of productivity differences.
The diffusion model has provided the major intellectual foundation of much of the research and extension effort in farm management and production economics since the emergence, in the latter years of the nineteenth century, of agricultural economics and rural sociology as separate subdisciplines linking the agricultural and the social sciences. Developments leading to the establishment of active programs of farm management research and extension occurred at a time when experi ment station research was making only a modest contribution to agricultural productivity growth. A further contribution to the effec tive diffusion of known technology was provided by rural sociologists' research on the diffusion process. Models were developed emphasiz ing the relationship between diffusion rates and the personality characteristics and educational accomplishments of farm operators.
Insights into the dynamics of the diffusion process, when coupled with the observation of wide agricultural productivity gaps among developed and less developed countries and a presumption of inefficient resource allocation among "irrational, tradition-bound" peasants, produced an extension or diffusion bias in the choice of agricultural development strategy in many LDCs during the 1950s. During the 1960s, the limita tions of the diffusion on technology transfer model as a foundation for the design of agricultural development policies became increasingly ap parent as technical assistance and rural development programs based explicitly or implicitly on this model failed to generate either rapid modernization of traditional farms and communities or rapid growth in agricultural output. There were very few opportunities to generate large productivity gains through the transfer of technology from one agroclimatic zone to another, or even among regions in the same agroclimatic zone. The pipeline was empty!
The High-Payoff Input Model
The inadequacy of policies based on the conservation, urban-industrial impact, and diffusion models led, in the 1960s, to a new perspective: The key to transforming a traditional agricultural sector into a produc tive source of economic growth is investment designed to make modern, high-payoff inputs available to farmers in poor countries. Peasants in traditional agricultural systems were viewed as rational, efficient resource allocators. 16 Ruttan In Transforming Traditional Agriculture, T.W. Schultz insisted that peasants in traditional societies remained poor because there were only limited technical and economic opportunities to which they could re spond. The new, high-payoff inputs were classified according to three categories: (1) the capacity of public and private sector research institu tions to produce new technical knowledge; (2) the capacity of the in dustrial sector to develop, produce, and market new technical inputs; and (3) the capacity of farmers to acquire new knowledge and use new inputs effectively.
The enthusiasm with which the high-payoff input model has been ac cepted and translated into economic doctrine has been due in part to the proliferation of studies reporting high rates of return to public in vestment in agricultural research (table 1) . It was also due to the suc cess of efforts to develop new, high-productivity grain varieties suitable for the tropics. New, high-yield wheat varieties were developed in Mex ico beginning in the 1950s, and new, high-yield rice varieties were developed in the Philippines in the 1960s. These varieties were highly responsive to industrial inputs such as fertilizer and other chemicals and to more effective soil and water management. The high returns associated with the adoption of the new varieties and the associated technical inputs and management practices have led to rapid growth in investment in agricultural research and to the development and adop tion of the new and more productive crop varieties among farmers in a number of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
But the acceptance of the high-pay off input model has been incomplete. Many countries have not yet freed their private sector to produce and market the new technical inputs that enhance productivity. Those are functions which the public sector typically performs poorly. The con straints placed on market development continue to deprive farmers and consumers of the gains from new technology that are becoming available.
There has been even greater reluctance, in a number of developing countries, to accept the implication of the high-payoff input model for the schooling of farm people. The intellectuals and planners in many developing countries find it difficult to understand the importance, for agricultural development, of a literate and a numerate peasantry. When advances in agricultural technology occurred slowly, the apprenticeship mode of learning, without formal schooling, from family and village elders was adequate. But when a continuous stream of new biological and mechanical technology becomes available the returns to the acquisi tion of new skills in production and marketing are driven up. It becomes important not only to accept but also to be able to adapt or reject the new "packages" of practices and inputs being recommended by research and extension services. Agricultural extension services themselves must be able to advance beyond simply recommending a package of prac tices or delivering technological and managerial messages to farmers. They must advance from teaching practices to teaching principles! It seems quite clear that Pakistan has not yet made the investment in the schooling of rural people to enable it to take full advantage of the potentially high-payoff technology that is becoming available. In spite of one of the world's great pieces of agricultural real estate 35 million acres of irrigated land in the Indus basin yields remain low by Asian standards. It is hard to avoid a conclusion that underinvest ment in human capital has dampened the rate of return to investment in land and water development and to agricultural research and extension.
Induced Technical Change in Agriculture
The high-payoff input model remains incomplete as a theory of agricultural development. Typically, education and research are public goods not traded through the marketplace. The mechanism by which resources are allocated among education, research, and other public and private sector economic activities was not fully incorporated into the model. It does not explain how economic conditions induce the development and adoption of an efficient set of technologies for a par ticular society. Nor does it attempt to specify the processes by which input and product price relationships induce investment in research in a direction consistent with a nation's particular resource endowments.
These limitations in the high-payoff input model led Yujiro Hay ami and I to develop a model of agricultural development in which technical change is treated as an exogenous factor. This induced innovation 1940-1955 1940-1957 1915-1960 1945-1962 1943-1963 1943-1963 1924-1967 1958-1969 1924-1967 1954-1967 1915-1950 1930-1961 1957-1972 1960-1971 1953-1973 1953-1972 1932-1973 1937-1942 1947-1952 1957-1962 1957-1972 Annual internal rate of return (%) 1966-1975 1966-1975 1906-1956 1948-1963 1957-1964 1961-1977 44 -48 34-44 23-37 79-96 30-35 1880-1938 1949-1959 1949-1959 1915-1960 1949-1959 1945-1958 1943-1963 1948-1969 1953-1971 1939-1948 1949-1958 1959-1968 1969-1972 1969 1969 1969 1960-1961 1950-1965 1966-1975 1966-1975 1966-1975 1966-1975 1960-1975 1949-1959 1964-1974 1868-1926 1927-1950 1927-1950 1948-1971 1948-1971 1948-1971 1948-1971 1948-1971 Technical Change 21 perspective was stimulated by historical evidence that different coun tries had followed alternative paths of technical change in the process of agricultural development. In the induced innovation model, changes or differences in the economic environment influence the direction of technical change. In discussing the induced innovation Model, I will find it useful, at the risk of some oversimplification, to use the term mechanical technology to refer to those technologies which substitute for labor and the term biological technology to refer to those technologies which generate increases in output per hectare.
Mechanical and Biological Processes in Agricultural Production
The mechanization of agricultural production cannot be treated as simply an adaptation of industrial methods of production to agriculture. The spatial nature of agricultural production results in significant dif ferences between agriculture and industry in patterns of machine use. It imposes severe limits on the efficiency of large scale production in agriculture.
The spatial dimension of crop production requires that the machines suitable for agricultural production must be mobile they must move across or through materials that are immobile in contrast to moving material through stationary machines as in most industrial processes. Furthermore, the seasonal or spatial characteristics of agricultural pro duction require a series of specialized machines for land preparation, planting, weed control and harvesting specifically designed for sequen tial operations, each of which is carried out for only a few days or weeks in each season. This means that it is no more feasible for workers to specialize in one operation in mechanized agriculture than in premechanized agriculture. It also means that in a "fully mechanized" agricultural system, the capital-labor ratio tends to be much higher than in the industrial sector in the same country.
In agriculture, biological and chemical processes are more fundamental than mechanization or machine processes. This generalization was equally true during the last century as it will be during the era of the "new biotechnology." Advances in biological and chemical technology in crop production have typically involved one or more of the follow ing three elements: (a) land and water resource development to pro vide a more satisfactory environment for plant growth; (b) modifica tion of the environment by the addition of organic and inorganic sources of plant nutrients to the soil to stimulate plant growth; (c) use of biological and chemical means to protect plants from pests and disease; and (d) selection and design of new biologically efficient crop varieties specifically adapted to respond to those elements in the environment that are subject to man's control. Similar processes can be observed in advances in animal agriculture.
The United States and Japan
One implication of the discussion of mechanical and biological pro cesses is that there are multiple paths of technical change in agriculture available to a society. The constraints imposed by an inelastic supply of land may be offset by advances in biological technology. The con straints imposed by an inelastic supply of labor may be offset by ad vances in mechanical technology. These alternatives are illustrated in figure 1 . The 1880-1980 land and labor productivity growth paths for Japan, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are plotted, along with the 1980 productivity ratios for a number of developing countries. The impression given by the several growth paths is that nature is relatively "plastic."
In economics, it has generally been accepted, at least since the publica tion of Theory of Wages by Sir John Hicks, that changes or differences in the relative prices of factors of production could influence the direc tion of invention or innovation. There has also been a second tradition, based on the work of Griliches and Schmookler, that has focused at tention on the influence of growth in product demand on the rate of technical change. We now turn to an illustration of the role of relative factor endowments and prices in the evolution of alternative paths of technical change in agriculture in the United States and Japan. Japan and the United States are characterized by extreme differences in relative endowments of land and labor (table 2) . In 1880, total agricultural land area per male worker was more than 60 times as large in the United States as in Japan, and arable land area per worker was about 20 times as large in the United States as in Japan. The differences have widened over time. By 1980, total agricultural land area per male worker was more than 100 times as large and arable land area per male worker about 50 times as large in the United States as in Japan.
The relative prices of land and labor also differed sharply in the two countries. In 1880 in order to buy a hectare of arable land (compare row 8 and row 16 in table 2), it would have been necessary for a Japanese hired farm worker to work eight times as many days as a U.S. farm worker. In the United States, the price of labor rose relative to the price of land, particularly between 1880 and 1920. In Japan, the price of land rose sharply relative to the price of labor, particularly between 1880 and 1900. By 1960 a Japanese farm worker would have had to work 30 times as many days as a U.S. farm worker in order to buy one hec tare of arable land. This gap was reduced after 1960, partly due to ex tremely rapid increases in wage rates in Japan during the two decades of "miraculous" economic growth. In the United States, land prices rose sharply in the postwar period primarily because of the rising de mand for land for nonagricultural use and the anticipation of continued inflation. Yet, in 1980 a Japanese farm worker still would have had to work 11 times as many days as a U.S. worker to buy one hectare of land.
In spite of these substantial differences in land area per worker and in the relative prices of land and labor, both the United States and Japan experienced relatively rapid rates of growth in production and produc tivity in agriculture (tables 3 and 4). Overall agricultural growth per formance for the entire 100-year period was very similar in the two countries. In both countries, total agricultural output increased at an annual compound rate of 1.6 percent, while total inputs (aggregate of conventional inputs) increased at a rate of 0.7 percent. Total factor pro ductivity (total output divided by total input) increased at an annual rate of 0.9 percent in both countries. Meanwhile, labor productivity measured by agricultural output per male worker increased at rates of 3.1 per- Table 2 Land-Labor Endowments and Relative Prices in Agriculture United States and Japan, Selected years USA (1) Agricultural land area (million ha.) (2) Arable land area (million ha.) (3) No. of male farm workers (thousand) (4) (l)/(3) (ha./worker) (5) (2)/(3) (ha./worker) (6) Value of arable land ($/ha.) (7) Farm wage rate ($/day) (8) (6)/(7) (days/ha.) Japan (9) Agricultural land area (thousand ha.)a (10) Arable land area (thousand ha.) (11) No. of male farm workers (thousand) (12) (9)/(ll) (ha./worker) (13) (10)/ (11) , 1985) . o a. Agricultural land areas in Japan for 1880-1960 are estimated by multiplying arable land areas by 1.16, the ratio of agricultural land area to arable l and area in the 1960 Census of Agriculture; this conversion factor changed to 1.05 for 1980 based on the 1980 Census of Agriculture.
<-rt cent per year in the United States and 2.7 percent in Japan. It is remarkable that the overall growth rates in output and productivity were so similar, despite the extremely different factor proportions that characterize the two countries.
Although there is a resemblance in the overall rates of growth in pro duction and productivity, the time sequences of the relatively fastgrowing phases and the relatively stagnant phases differ between the two countries. In the United States, agricultural output grew rapidly up to 1900; then the growth rate decelerated. From the 1900s to the 1930s there was little gain in total productivity. This stagnation phase was succeeded by a dramatic rise in production and productivity in the 1940s and 1950s. Japan experienced rapid increases in agricultural pro duction and productivity from 1880 to the 1910s, then entered into a stagnation phase, which lasted until the mid-1930s. Another rapid ex pansion phase commenced during the period of recovery from the devastation of World War n. Roughly speaking, the United States ex perienced a stagnation phase two decades earlier than Japan and also shifted to the second development phase two decades earlier.
The effect of relative prices on the development and choice of technology is illustrated with remarkable clarity for biological technology in figure 2. In figure 2, U.S. and Japanese data on the relationship be tween fertilizer input per hectare of arable land and the fertilizer/land price ratio are plotted for the period 1880 to 1980. In both 1880 and 1980, U.S. farmers were using less fertilizer than Japanese farmers. Despite enormous differences in both physical and institutional resources, however, the relationship between these variables has been almost iden tical in the two countries. As the price of fertilizer declined relative to other factors, scientists in both countries responded by inventing crop varieties that were more responsive to the lower prices of fertilizer. American scientists, however, always lagged behind the Japanese by several decades because the lower prices of land relative to the price of fertilizer in the United States resulted in a lower priority being plac ed on yield-increasing technology.
The effect of changes in the relative prices of mechanical power and labor in the United States and Japan for 1880-1980 is illustrated in figure 3. In both 1880 and 1980, U.S. farmers were using more mechanical power than Japanese farmers. The relationship between the power-labor price ratio and the use of power per worker is almost identical in the two countries, but because labor was always less expensive in Japan, the Japanese suppliers of mechanical technology always lagged behind U.S. suppliers by several decades. The effect of a rise in the price of fertilizer relative to the price of land or in the price of labor relative to the price of machinery has been to induce advances in biological and mechanical technology. The ef fect of the introduction of lower cost and more productive biological and mechanical technology has been to induce farmers to substitute fer tilizer for land and mechanical power for labor. These responses to dif ferences in resource endowments among countries and to changes in resource endowments over time by agricultural research institutions, by the farm supply industries, and by farmers, has been remarkably similar in spite of differences in cultures and traditions.
The results of our comparative analyses can be summarized as follows: Agricultural growth in the United States and Japan during the period 1880-1980 can best be understood when viewed as a dynamic factor substitution process. Factors have been substituted for each other along a metaproduction function in response to long-run trends in relative factor prices. Each point on the metaproduction surface is characterized by a technology which can be described in terms of specific sources of power, types of machinery, crop varieties, and animal breeds. Movements along this metaproduction surface involve technical changes. These technical changes have been induced to a significant extent by the long-term trends in relative factor prices. 
Perspective
In the closing decades of the twentieth century we are approaching the end of the most remarkable transitions in the history of agriculture.
Prior to the beginning of this century, almost all increases in agricultural production occurred as a result of increases in area cultivated. The major exceptions were in Western Europe, where livestock-based conservation systems of farming had developed, and in East Asia, where wet rice cultivation systems had developed.
But by the end of this century there will be few significant areas where agricultural production can be expanded by simply adding more land to production. Expansion of agricultural output will have to be obtain ed almost entirely from more intensive cultivation of the areas already being used for agricultural production. Increases in food and fiber pro duction will depend, in large measure, on continuous advances in agricultural technology.
The task before us is clear. It is imperative, over the next several decades, that we complete the establishment of agricultural research capacity for each commodity of economic significance in each agroclimatic region of the world.
A developing country which fails to evolve a capacity for technical and institutional innovation in agriculture consistent with its resource and cultural endowments suffers two major constraints on its attempts to develop a productive agriculture. It is unable to take advantage of advances in biological and chemical technologies suited to labor-intensive agricultural systems. And the mechanical technology it does import from more developed countries will be productive only under conditions of large-scale agricultural organization. It will contribute to the emergence of a "bimodal" rather than a "unimodal" organization structure.
During the last two decades a number of developing countries have begun to establish the institutional capacity to generate technical changes adapted to national and regional resource endowments. More recently, these emerging national systems have been buttressed by a new system of international crop and animal research institutes. These new institutes have become both important soures of new knowledge and technology and increasingly effective communication links among the developing national research systems.
The lag in shifting from a natural resource-based to a science-based system of agriculture continues to be a source of national differences in land and labor productivity. Lags in the development and applica tion of knowledge are also important sources of regional productivity differences within countries. In countries such as Mexico and Pakistan, differential rates of technical change have been an important source of the widening disparities in the rate of growth of total agricultural out put, in labor and land productivity, and in incomes and wage rates among regions.
Productivity differences in agriculture are increasingly a function of investments in scientific and industrial capacity and in the education of rural people rather than of natural resource endowments. The ef fects of education on productivity are particularly important during periods in which a nation's agricultural research system begins to in troduce new technology. In an agricultural system characterized by static technology, there are few gains to be realized from education in rural areas. Rural people who have lived for generations with essentially the same resources and the same technology have learned from long ex perience what their efforts can get out of the resources available to them. Children acquire from their parents the skills that are worthwhile. For mal schooling has little economic value in agricultural production.
As soon as new technical opportunities become available, this situa tion changes. Technical change requires the acquisition of new husbandry skills; acquisition from nontraditional sources of additional resources such as new seeds, new chemicals, and new equipment; and develop ment of new skills in dealing with both natural resources and with the input and product market institutions that link agriculture with the nonagricultural sector.
The processes by which new knowledge can be applied to alter the rate and direction of technical change in agriculture, are, however, substantially greater than our knowledge of the processes by which resources are brought to bear on the process of institutional innovation and transfer. Yet the need for viable institutions capable of supporting more rapid agricultural growth and rural development is even more com pelling today than a decade ago.
